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Abstract: Lucas (1987, 2003) estimates that the cost of ￿ uctuations is less
than 0.1% of consumption. In other words, a social planner would pay no
more than 0.1% of (permanent) consumption to eliminate all future business
cycle ￿ uctuations. The current paper extends Lucas￿calculations by study-
ing the costs of ￿ uctuations arising from asset bubbles. We estimate two
classes of costs: consumption volatility due only to asset price volatility, and
consumption volatility due to asset trading interacted with price volatility.
We show that the magnitude of these welfare costs is driven by heterogeneous
household portfolios. If assets are held proportionately across the population,
the welfare costs fall by an order of magnitude. Our benchmark calibration,
which assumes a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of 3, implies that the
asset bubbles of the last decade generated a social welfare cost equal to a
permanent 3 percent reduction in the level of national consumption. Our
calculations are sensitive to the details of the calibration, including the de-
gree of balance sheet and trading heterogeneity, the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion, and the magnitude of the asset bubble. Our speci￿cations with rea-
sonable parameter values generate welfare costs ranging from 1 to 10 percent
of (permanent) national consumption.
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11 Introduction
Consumption is approximately the annuity-value of wealth, so volatile wealth
dynamics can generate volatile consumption dynamics.1 The current paper
models and calibrates the linkages from asset price movements to consump-
tion and estimates the consequences of asset bubbles for social welfare.
Because of active market timing, lifecycle portfolio adjustment, or other
trading motives, some households are net buyers of assets and some house-
holds are net sellers. Such transactions produce inter-household transfers
when asset prices deviate from fundamentals. We refer to such inter-household
transfers as an asset trading e⁄ect.
Households that own bubble-priced assets perceive that they are wealth-
ier than they actually are. Consequently, they raise consumption during a
bubble period: i.e., borrow more and lower active savings. When asset prices
eventually return to their fundamental values, these households need to re-
duce their consumption to re￿ ect their new net worth. This consumption
reduction necessarily overshoots the initial consumption increase, since the
households need to implicitly ￿pay back￿the fraction of consumption during
the bubble years that is discovered (ex-post) to be above the annuity value
of their assets. In other words, during the bubble the agent overconsumes
relative to the true annuity value of wealth. After the bubble, the agent
correspondingly underconsumes relative to the pre-bubble annuity value of
wealth. We refer to this dynamic pattern as a consumption boom/bust e⁄ect.
Asset trading e⁄ects and consumption boom/bust e⁄ects jointly generate
excess consumption volatility. In the current paper we model these e⁄ects and
calculate the resulting welfare costs. We provide exact calculations and we
provide Taylor approximations that express these e⁄ects with simple closed
form equations. Four key expressions emerge from the Taylor approxima-
tions.
First, there is an asset trading welfare cost. The welfare cost arising from
this channel ￿expressed as a fraction of permanent consumption ￿is given
1An important exception is the case in which wealth ￿ uctuations are driven by interest
rate ￿ uctuations. For evidence on the propensity to consume out of variation in housing
wealth, see Greenspan and Kennedy (2007, 2008) and Bosworth and Smart (2009). Carroll
et al. (2006) and Campbell and Coco (2007) estimate a housing-wealth MPC of nine
percent.
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In this expression, ￿ is the coe¢ cient or relative risk aversion, ￿ is the magni-
tude of the asset bubble as a fraction of the fundamental value of the capital
stock, ￿ is the annual discount rate, and N is the duration of the bubble
(years). Finally, ki is the net value of capital (using pre-bubble prices) pur-
chased by household i during the bubble; and Wi is the total net worth of
household i (including human capital). The asset-trading e⁄ect is increasing
in risk aversion, in the square of the magnitude of the asset bubble, in the
cross-sectional variance of normed asset trading, and in the growth of the
bubble. In our benchmark calibration, the asset trading e⁄ect represents a
welfare cost that is equivalent to 1.6% of consumption.
The asset trading e⁄ect has no ￿rst-order consequences for welfare, since
every gain from selling the overpriced asset is o⁄set by a loss (in another
household) from buying the overpriced asset. However, second order e⁄ects
don￿ t cancel. Concavity in the utility function causes the gains in marginal
utility to be more than o⁄set by the losses in marginal utility. Finally, the
asset trading e⁄ect vanishes as heterogeneity is reduced ￿i.e. as V ar
￿
ki
Wi
￿
;
the cross-sectional variance of asset purchases, goes to zero.
Second, we identify a boom/bust e⁄ect. The welfare cost arising from
this channel ￿expressed as a fraction of permanent consumption ￿is given
by
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The new variables include: p, the fraction of households that hold zero claims
to the aggregate capital stock; K, the aggregate stock of capital; Ki, the net
claim to the capital stock of household i; and W, the aggregate net worth of
the agents in the economy (including human capital). The boom/bust e⁄ect
is increasing in risk aversion, in the square of the magnitude of the asset
bubble, in the concentration of holding of the capital stock, in the square
of the normed size of the capital stock, in the cross-sectional variance of
normed capital holding, and in the growth of the bubble. In our benchmark
calibration, boom/bust e⁄ects account for welfare costs equal to 1.3% of
permanent consumption.
The boom/bust e⁄ect also has no ￿rst-order consequences, since every
￿rst-order gain from overconsumming (relative to the true annuity value of
3wealth) during the bubble is o⁄set by a ￿rst-order loss from underconsuming
(relative to the pre-bubble annuity value of wealth) after the bubble bursts.
However, second order e⁄ects again survive due to concavity. Finally, the
boom/bust e⁄ect drops by an order of magnitude as heterogeneity is re-
duced ￿i.e. as p goes to zero and as V ar
￿
ln
Ki
Wi
￿ ￿
￿Ki > 0
￿
goes to zero. At
this homogeneous limit, the boom bust e⁄ect is 0.5% of consumption in our
benchmark calibration. Hence, heterogeneity is also a key contributor to this
e⁄ect.
Third, we identify a covariance e⁄ect, which arises because of interactions
between the previous two e⁄ects.
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The covariance e⁄ect is increasing in risk aversion, in the square of the mag-
nitude of the asset bubble, in the cross-sectional covariance of normed capital
holding and normed capital trading, and in the growth of the bubble. In our
calibration the covariance e⁄ect represents a cost that is equivalent to -0.6%
of permanent consumption. In other words, this third e⁄ect turns out to par-
tially o⁄set the other two. Mean reversion in household portfolio allocations
induce a negative covariance between
Ki
Wi (household i￿ s original holdings of
the capital stock) and
ki
Wi (household i￿ s net purchases of the capital stock).
This negative covariance reduces the welfare costs. Intuitively, households
that tend to allocate the greatest portfolio share to domestic capital, Ki;
when the bubble begins, and hence are likely to raise their consumption the
most during the bubble, are also the households that probabilistically sell
the most capital during the bubble period, thereby partially cushioning the
fall in consumption when the bubble bursts. The covariance e⁄ect vanishes
in the homogeneous case.
Fourth, we identify an aggregation e⁄ect, which arises since the social
welfare cost is not a linear weighted average of the individual welfare costs.
Speci￿cally, because the utility function is concave, welfare costs aggregate in
a way that overweights the households with the largest welfare losses. Specif-
ically, the social welfare cost is equal to the average value of the household-
level welfare costs (the sum of the three terms above) plus an adjustment
term for aggregation:
￿
2
V (￿i)
1 ￿ E￿i
;
4where ￿i is the welfare cost of household i: Since E￿i is close to zero, this
aggregation e⁄ect is essentially ￿=2 times the variance of the individual house-
holds￿welfare costs. In our calibration this aggregation e⁄ect is equivalent
to 1.4% of permanent consumption. This aggregation e⁄ect also vanishes in
the homogeneous case.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we review the related liter-
ature. In Section 3 we describe our model. In Section 4, we work out the
welfare costs of an asset bubble, using both exact methods and a second-
order Taylor expansion. In Section 5, we calibrate the model, including a
discussion of micro-level data from the Heath and Retirement Study and the
Survey of Consumer Finances. In the empirical analysis, we provide a new
distributional result: the ratio of equity+housing wealth to total net worth
is well-approximated in the cross-section by a log-normal distribution plus
mass at zero. Section 6 presents our welfare cost results ￿both exact results
and approximations. Section 7 discusses potential extensions of our model
and section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Real Business Cycle models imply that policy-makers should not adopt counter-
cyclical policies, since ￿ uctuations are optimal responses to changing funda-
mentals (e.g., Kydland and Prescott 1982; Prescott, 1986).2 However, some
economic models do imply that policy-makers should adopt counter-cyclical
policies. Lucas (1987) calculates an upper bound for the bene￿ts of such
counter-cyclical policies. Lucas considers a representative agent with con-
stant relative risk aversion. Lucas models consumption as a log linear trend
with noise:
ct = Aexp(gt + "t ￿ ￿
2=2):
Here A is a scaling parameter, g is the long-run growth rate, " is an iid
Gaussian random variable with standard deviation ￿. This implies that
the welfare cost of ￿ uctuations is approximately (1=2)￿￿2; where ￿ is the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
Lucas uses US data from the period after World War II to calibrate the
model and to estimate how much the representative agent would be willing
2Tirole (1985) shows that asset price bubbles can be rational and may even increase
welfare. See also Caballero et al., (2009).
5to give up as fraction of consumption in order to set ￿ = 0. Lucas shows
that, for reasonable values of the coe¢ cient of risk aversion, the welfare
cost of economic ￿ uctuations is very low, in fact not more than 0.1% of
consumption.3
The most frequent critique of this result assumes heterogeneous agents
and incomplete markets. Such assumptions can raise the welfare costs relative
to Lucas￿estimates, but the results are mixed and the average welfare cost
is still generally estimated to be no more than 1% (e.g., Atkeson and Phelan
1994, Imrohoroglu 1989, Krusell et al., 2009, Krusell and Smith, 1999, Krebs,
2007, Mukoyama and Sahin, 2006 and Storesletten et al., 2001).
Other analyses of Lucas￿result have studied Krep-Porteus or Epstein-
Zin preferences (e.g., Dolmas, 1998; and Otrok, 2001), asset-pricing kernels
to generate a shadow-cost for ￿ uctuations (Tallarini 2000), ￿ uctuations that
are persistent instead of being transitory (Obstfeld 1994; and Barro 2006,
2009), and growth that is negatively linked to ￿ uctuations (Barlevy 2004).
3 Model
We analyze a continuous-time, small open economy that faces ￿xed world fac-
tor prices (cf. Laibson and Mollerstrom, 2009). Heterogeneous households,
with an index i that is temporarily suppressed, maximize an exponentially
weighted integral of utility ￿ ows:
1 Z
0
exp(￿￿t)u(Ct)dt;
subject to non-stochastic dynamics
dKt = Y
L
t ￿ Ct + r(Kt ￿ Dt ￿ Bt) + dDt + dBt:
Here ￿ is the exponential discount rate, Kt is domestic capital, Y L
t is ￿xed
labor income, Ct is consumption, r is the real interest rate, Dt is net foreign
debt (so ￿Dt is net foreign assets), and Bt is net domestic debt. Across
3A related conclusion was reached by Cochrane (1989) who studied the welfare costs
for consumers when they make small mistakes and therefore deviate from the optimal
consumption path. Cochrane estimated that these ￿near-rational mistakes￿incur costs
that are less than $1 per quarter.
6households, Bt adds up to zero. We assume that r = ￿, which is a standard
steady state restriction. Finally, we assume that households have constant
relative risk aversion, ￿.
u(Ct) =
C
1￿￿
t ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
:
We assume that an asset bubble begins an instant after date t = 0 and
ends at date N. In other words, the bubble exists when t 2 (0; N]: The
pre-bubble state of the economy will be the benchmark to which we keep
referring. Hence, we adopt special notation for all variables at date zero.
Speci￿cally, whenever we drop the time subscript, we are implicitly referring
to the date 0 (pre-bubble) value of the variable. For example, we let C = C0:
We assume that the asset bubble immediately raises the notional value
of ￿xed capital by an increment ￿K: We conceptualize the bubble as the
discounted value of productivity gains that are anticipated to occur N periods
away.9 Agents expect a unit of domestic capital to yield returns of r from
date 0 to date N; and returns of
r[1 + exp(rN)￿]
thereafter. So a physical unit of domestic capital has price (1 + ￿) when the
bubble begins an instant after date t = 0:
The marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is r; so that the ￿K
increase in notional wealth leads consumption to rise by r￿K:
Since r = ￿; pre-bubble consumption is equal to the annuity value of
wealth:
C = Y
L + r(K ￿ D ￿ B):
Bubble consumption is the annuity value of bubble-inclusive wealth:
C
0 = Y
L + r(K ￿ D ￿ B) + r￿K:
Recall that assets appreciate at rate r; so throughout the bubble period
households hold wealth with notional value ￿K + K ￿ D ￿ B: Capital gains
and dividends are exactly o⁄set by consumption.
9These productivity gains need to be anticipated to occur in the future to enable the
bubble to persist in the meantime. The bubble bursts on the date that the anticipated
productivity gains fail to be realized. In this way our model is similar to that of Beaudry
and Portier (2007) where news about the future changes expectations in a way that impacts
consumption, investment and growth. Even more relevant is Christiano et al (2007), which
investigages what happens when such expectations turn out to be wrong.
7We also allow our agents to trade assets. This will only matter during
the bubble period: agents who buy domestic capital will be harmed (since
the asset is over-valued) and agents that sell domestic capital will bene￿t.
To track this trading, we introduce a new variable k; which represents the
net change in the physical units of bubble asset accumulated by an agent.
Negative values of k represent a net reduction in the physical units of the
bubble asset. If we norm the pre-bubble real price of the bubble asset to
1, then an agent who pays 1 + ￿ dollars to buy domestic capital during the
bubble period will take possession of 1 extra physical unit of K: For this
illustrative example, k = 1: Since domestic capital is only held by domestic
agents, it follows that the average value of k; across all households, is 0.
Agents who buy domestic capital (during the bubble period) are left with
a rude shock when the bubble bursts. They experience an additional capital
loss exp(rN)￿k at the time the bubble bursts: This is the additional capital
loss that arises from acquiring k physical units of domestic capital. Without
loss of generality we assume that domestic agents ￿nance purchases of in-
cremental domestic capital with domestic borrowing. Likewise, a domestic
agent who sells an incremental unit of domestic capital uses the proceeds of
this sale to make domestic loans. For example, an agent who buys k units of
physical capital at date ￿ 2 [0;N) borrows B￿ ￿B = [1 + exp(r￿)￿]k on the
domestic market to do so. We assume that the agent uses her income from k
to ￿nance this new domestic debt. However, this income is not su¢ cient to
￿nance all of the new domestic debt, since the period of higher productivity
has not yet arrived. We assume that the residual domestic debt is rolled
over, so the domestic debt is equal to
B￿ ￿ B = [1 + exp(r￿)￿]k:
During the bubble period, households have a gap between their desired
level of consumption C0 = Y L+r(K￿D￿B)+r￿K and the level of physical
income from domestic assets Y L+r(K ￿D￿B): The gap, r￿K; is borrowed
as a ￿ ow from abroad.10 The resulting change to the trade de￿cit (which is
10We assume that households borrow from foreign agents rather than selling the foreign
agents over-valued domestic assets. The domestic agents have no reason to sell the domes-
tic assets since they don￿ t recognize that they are overvalued. Moreover, if the over-valued
assets have value that is best-realized by local owners (e.g., residential real estate), then
there are good reasons to expect that the foreign agents will primarily acquire ￿xed income
claims.
8the same as the initial change to the current account de￿cit) is
r￿K:
since the k0s average out to zero.
The trade de￿cit continues at this level throughout the bubble period. By
contrast, the current account de￿cit grows, since the foreign debt is growing:
households must also pay interest on the accumulating shortfalls. Integrating
these ￿ ows yields the net accumulation of foreign debt during a sub-period
[0;￿] of the bubble period (where ￿ ￿ N):
D￿ ￿ D =
Z ￿
0
r￿K exp(r[￿ ￿ s])ds
= [exp(r￿) ￿ 1]￿K
So the (change in the) current account de￿cit from date 0; an instant before
the bubble starts, to date ￿ < N; is
jCA￿ ￿ CAj = r￿K + r[exp(r￿) ￿ 1]￿K:
During the bubble, assets at the household level can be decomposed into
domestic assets valued at
￿ (K + k)exp(r￿) + (K + k);
debt to foreign agents valued at
D + [exp(r￿) ￿ 1]￿K:
and debt to domestic agents valued at
[1 + exp(r￿)￿]k + B
Note that the net wealth is
￿K + K ￿ D ￿ B:
When the bubble bursts (at date N), the household is left with net assets:
K ￿ D ￿ B ￿ [exp(rN) ￿ 1]￿K ￿ exp(rN)￿k:
9So consumption falls from
Y
L + r(K ￿ D ￿ B) + r￿K
to
Y
L + r(K ￿ D ￿ B) ￿ r[exp(rN) ￿ 1]￿K ￿ rexp(rN)￿k
In other words, consumption falls by
r￿ (K + k)exp(rN):
We can decompose this into three e⁄ects:
(r￿K + r￿k)
| {z }
￿ exp(rN)
| {z }
Direct bubble e⁄ect + Trading e⁄ect Accumulation e⁄ect
:
The direct bubble e⁄ect is the reversal in the initial consumption boom.
The trading e⁄ect is the additional reduction in wealth associated with loss
(or gain) on assets that have been acquired during the bubble period. The
accumulation e⁄ect is the consequence of growing the bubble at rate r over
an interval of length N: As the duration of the bubble goes to zero, the
accumulation e⁄ect ceases to matter: limN!0 exp(rN) = 1:
3.1 Distributional assumptions
We now study inter-household di⁄erences. Consequently, we will start using
household subscripts.
We assume that the initial distribution of capital follows a two-part dis-
tribution. A mass p of consumers have Ki = 0: The remaining mass 1￿p has
a log normal distribution of Ki levels (see the calibration section for empirical
evidence that validates this assumption). Speci￿cally,
Ki
Ci
=
￿
0 with probability p
exp(￿ + "i ￿ ￿2
"=2) with probablity 1 ￿ p
where "i is normally distributioned with mean zero and variance ￿2
". More-
over, "i is independent of Ci and iid across households. This implies that,
Z
Kidi = (1 ￿ p)
Z
Ci exp(￿ + "i ￿ ￿
2
"=2)di
Z
Kidi = (1 ￿ p)exp(￿)
Z
Cidi
￿ = ln
Z
Kidi ￿ ln
Z
Cidi ￿ ln(1 ￿ p)
10We will exploit this relationship when we calibrate the economy in section
5. In that calibration, we also truncate the right-hand-tail of the log-normal
density to prevent extreme welfare costs for households with large positions
in the bubble asset.
Finally, we need to characterize the distribution of trades, k: To do this,
we ￿rst characterize the Markov process that relates Ki to K0
i: Suppose that
at each iteration of this Markov process, a fraction of the population 1 ￿ ￿
stays at their old level of domestic capital, and the remainder ￿ adjusts their
domestic capital. For simplicity, we assume that the adjusting households
are randomly dropped into the same ergodic distribution. Speci￿cally,
K
0
i =
8
<
:
Ki with probability 1 ￿ ￿
0 with probability ￿p0
Ci exp(￿ + "0
i ￿ ￿2
"=2) with probability ￿(1 ￿ p0)
We use this ergodic assumption to (numerically) back out the distribution of
the transaction variable
ki = K
0
i ￿ Ki:
4 Welfare calculations
We ￿rst characterize the welfare of a single agent in this economy. We then
show how to aggregate these agents into a social welfare cost.
An individual agent has consumption of
Y
L + r(K ￿ D) + r￿K = C + r￿K
during the bubble and
Y
L + r(K ￿ D) ￿ r[exp(rN) ￿ 1](￿K) ￿ rexp(rN)￿k
= C ￿ r[exp(rN) ￿ 1](￿K) ￿ rexp(rN)￿k
11after the bubble. So utility is given by
Z N
0
exp(￿￿t) u(C + r￿K) dt
+
Z 1
N
exp(￿￿t) u(C ￿ r[exp(rN) ￿ 1](￿K) ￿ rexp(rN)￿k) dt
=
1 ￿ exp(￿￿N)
￿
u(C + r￿K)
+
exp(￿￿N)
￿
u(C ￿ r[exp(rN) ￿ 1](￿K) ￿ rexp(rN)￿k)
We can compare this to the counterfactual of a bubble-free economy.
Without the bubble, lifetime utility would have been
1
￿
u(C):
4.1 Exact welfare calculations
We ￿rst provide an exact calculation of the welfare costs engendered by the
bubble. As noted before, we are only measuring the welfare costs associated
with ￿ uctuations (and ignoring any welfare costs associated with the loss of
resources or output). For any individual agent, we can solve for the factor ￿i
that equates the welfare they received as a result of the bubble epsiode and
the welfare they would have received had they instead simply scaled their
pre-bubble consumption by ￿i: The implicit equation for ￿i is given below.
[1 ￿ exp(￿￿N)]u(Ci + r￿Ki)
+ exp(￿￿N)u(Ci ￿ r[exp(rN) ￿ 1](￿Ki) ￿ rexp(rN)￿ki)
= u(￿iCi)
Rearranging this expression, yields a closed-form expression for ￿i :
"
[1 ￿ exp(￿￿N)]
￿
1 + r￿
Ki
Ci
￿1￿￿
+ exp(￿￿N)
￿
1 ￿ r[exp(rN) ￿ 1]￿
Ki
Ci
￿ rexp(rN)￿
ki
Ci
￿1￿￿# 1
1￿￿
We can also relate the individual ￿i coe¢ cients to an aggregate ￿ that
has the property that if every agent￿ s consumption pre-bubble were uniformly
12scaled down by ￿; then the equilibrium path welfare (with the bubble) would
equal the counterfactual welfare resulting from scaled consumption (without
the bubble). More formally, ￿ is given by the following equation:
Z
u(￿Ci)
￿
di =
Z
u(￿iCi)
￿
di
Constant relative risk aversion implies that
Z
￿
1￿￿u(Ci)
￿
di =
Z
￿
1￿￿
i
u(Ci)
￿
di:
Hence,
￿ =
"R
￿
1￿￿
i u(Ci)di R
u(Ci)di
# 1
1￿￿
:
When all of the households are ex-ante identical, so that Ci = Cj for all i;j
pairs, this reduces to
￿ =
￿Z
￿
1￿￿
i di
￿ 1
1￿￿
:
To gain intuition for this magnitude, it is helpful to rewrite it as
￿
1￿￿ =
Z
￿
1￿￿
i di: (3)
It follows that ￿ is the certainty equivalent ￿ consumption￿of an ￿ agent￿with
constant relative risk aversion ￿ and stochastic ￿ consumption￿￿i:
4.2 Taylor Approximation of Welfare Cost
We now use a second-order Taylor expansion to calculate the welfare loss
from the asset bubble. We want to ￿nd ￿ such that
[1 ￿ exp(￿￿N)]u
￿
Y
L + r(K ￿ D) + r￿K
￿
+ exp(￿￿N)u
￿
Y
L + r(K ￿ D) ￿ r[exp(rN) ￿ 1](￿K) ￿ rexp(rN)￿k
￿
= u
￿
￿ + Y
L + r(K ￿ D)
￿
We are interested in solving for
￿
￿
C
= ￿;
13which is the permanent percent reduction in pre-bubble consumption that
produces a reduction in welfare equivalent to the experience of the bubble.
Hence,
￿i = 1 ￿ ￿i
We expand the argument of the utility function around C = Y L +r(K ￿
D): Since this expansion is algebraicly intensive and conceptually routine,
we provide the details in the appendix. For an individual household the
second-order expansion yields,
￿i =
￿
2
￿
r￿
Ci
￿2 ￿
K
2
i
￿
e
rN ￿ 1
￿
+ 2kiKi
￿
e
rN ￿ 1
￿
+ k
2
ie
rN￿
:
We can also integrate across households to produce an average value for ￿i:
This derivation exploits the fact that the average value of ki is zero. The
average welfare cost,
R
￿idi; is given by
￿
2
￿
r￿
C
￿2 ￿
E
￿
K
2
i
￿￿
e
rN ￿ 1
￿
+ 2Cov(k;K)
￿
e
rN ￿ 1
￿
+ V ar(k)e
rN￿
:
This can be broken down into three terms, using the fact that Ci = rWi:
First, there is a consumption boom/bust e⁄ect:
￿
2
￿
2(1 ￿ p)
￿1
￿
K
W
￿2
exp
￿
￿
2
"
￿￿
e
rN ￿ 1
￿
: (4)
Second, there is a covariance e⁄ect:
￿￿
2 Cov
￿
ki
Wi
;
Ki
Wi
￿ ￿
e
rN ￿ 1
￿
: (5)
Third, there is an asset trading e⁄ect:
￿
2
￿
2V ar
￿
ki
Wi
￿
e
rN: (6)
Finally, we need to aggregate these e⁄ects. As already noted, aggrega-
tion is not linear. Concavity implies that the aggregate ￿ is the certainty
equivalent of the individual ￿i (cf equation 3). Using a second-order Taylor
expansion,
￿ ￿ E￿i +
￿
2
V (￿i)
E￿i
:
14In other words, the aggregate social welfare cost is the sum of equations 4,
5, and 6, plus an aggregation e⁄ect,
￿
2
V (￿i)
1 ￿ E￿i
:
Since E￿i is close to zero, this aggregation e⁄ect is essentially ￿=2 times the
variance of the individual households￿welfare costs.
We calibrate and compare our measures of welfare loss in the next section
of the paper.
5 Calibration of the model
For tractability, we study the steady state, in which r = ￿ = 0:05. Our
baseline value for the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is ￿ = 3. We also
consider CRRA values from 1 to 5.
We need to calibrate the (plausible) magnitude of the U.S. asset bubbles.
Figure 1 plots the U.S. ratio of household wealth minus government debt4
all divided by GDP.11 This series ￿ uctuated historically in a range roughly
between 2.5 and 3 units of GDP. Starting in the late-1990￿ s, however, the
series broke from this historical range and rose sharply. At its peak in the
4th quarter of 2006, the series reached a value of 4.1 units of GDP. By the
4th quarter of 2008, the series had fallen back to its historical range. These
comparisons imply an estimated peak bubble value of about 1.1 units of GDP.
However, the ratio of household wealth to GDP misses part of the value
of the bubble, since it nets out the value of debt accumulated to ￿nance
consumption during the bubble years. Household debt increased from 0.3
units of GDP from the late 1990￿ s to 2006:4. This analysis implies that
had U.S. households not consumed some of their bubble wealth, the ratio of
economy-wide net worth would have risen 1.65 units of GDP. Since,
￿ =
￿
￿K
K
￿
1998
= e
(g￿r)(2006￿1998)
￿
￿K
Y
￿
2006
￿
Y
C
￿
1998
￿
C
K
￿
1998
= 0:33:
4Government debt includes federal, state, and local sources.
11The numerator is compiled by the Federal Reserve and is available back to 1952.
15Figure 1: Household net worth minus total government debt all 
divided by GDP (1951:4 – 2009:3).  y ( )
4.50
3.50
4.00
3.00
2.00
2.50
1951Q4 1961Q4 1971Q4 1981Q4 1991Q4 2001Q4
Sources: Federal Reserve Board flow of funds balance sheets, Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA accounts,
d h’ll and authors’ calculations.For this calculation we take g = 0:02; r = 0:05;
￿
￿K
Y
￿
2006 = 1:1; Y
C = 3
2;
and C
K = 1
5: Here g is the real growth rate in GDP. This calculation implies
that the total value of the bubble is 0.33 of the value of all domestic capital
(including land). To err on the side of conservativism, we set ￿ = 0:3 in our
benchmark calibration.
We calibrate the distribution of Ki from the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Though the HRS has the
limitation that it only covers respondents who are middle-aged or older, the
HRS has an o⁄setting advantage. Respondents are surveyed longitudinally
every two years, whereas the SCF is purely cross-sectional.5
First, we use the HRS to construct a household-level estimate of
Ki
Wi; where
Wi is total household resources, including an estimate of the value of human
capital.6 In our model it should be the case that
Ki
Wi =
￿Ki
Ci : This procedure
is explained in our second appendix. Figure 2 plots the distribution of
Ki
Wi;
for seven di⁄erent waves of HRS surveys (starting in 1992/93 and ending
in 2006).7 The distributions all have two distinct components. First, there
is substantial mass at zero (about 15% of the HRS households have no K
assets). Second, a log-normal distribution ￿ts the data that is greater than
zero. To con￿rm this second parametric property, we analyze the households
with K > 0, and plot the natural log of their
Ki
Wi ratios. Figure 3 plots these
distributions for the same seven waves of HRS surveys. Figure 3 also super-
imposes a Gaussian density to con￿rm our parametric assumptions. In our
actual simulations (for exact calculations of welfare losses), we truncate the
log normal distribution so that
Ki
Ci ￿ 30: Furthermore, we distinguish between
the mass-at-zero and greater-than-zero sub-distributions by partitioning the
data at the 18th (for the HRS waves) and 30th (for the SCF waves) per-
centiles. This is done to rule out extreme welfare losses (for households with
extreme values of K):
Our natural log plots from the HRS have associated standard deviations
5The HRS asset data is of higher quality than the asset data in the Panel Survey on
Income Dynamics.
6Both the HRS and the SCF bias down this ratio by collapsing private businesses into
a net equity summary statistic. For example, a family business with $1 million of assets
and $800,000 in debt would be recorded in these data sets as a private equity position of
$200,000. This understates the household￿ s leverage.
7The data in Figures 2 and 4 are displayed between ratio values of 0 and 1.5. In Figures
3 and 5 we display all data points with log ratio values within 2.5 of the sub-distribution
mean.
16Figure 2: Distribution of K=W [HRS]
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(g) Mean = 0.2354, SD = 0.4186Figure 3: Distribution of ln(K=W) for non-zero households [HRS]
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(g) Mean = -1.5050, SD = 0.8094Figure 4: Distribution of K=W [SCF]
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(d) Mean = 0.1933, SD = 0.1881
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(f) Mean = 0.2297, SD = 0.2904Figure 5: Distribution of ln(K=W) for non-zero households [SCF]
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(a) Mean = -1.6512, SD = 0.7219
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SCF Log Distribution 1995
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(b) Mean = -1.6148, SD = 0.6600
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SCF Log Distribution 1998
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(c) Mean = -1.5257, SD = 0.6145
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SCF Log Distribution 2001
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(d) Mean = -1.4747, SD = 0.6086
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SCF Log Distribution 2004
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(e) Mean = -1.3325, SD = 0.5593
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SCF Log Distribution 2007
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(f) Mean = -1.2709, SD = 0.5617that range from 0.72 to 0.82 (depending on the wave of the HRS). In Figures
3 and 4 we plot analogous ￿gures generated by the SCF. The SCF plots in
Figure 4 have standard deviations that range from 0.56 to 0.72. We therefore
adopt a benchmark standard deviation, ￿"; of 0.70 for our calculations.
The U.S. Census Bureau reports that the household homeownership rate
ranged from a low of 65.9% (1998q1) to a high of 69.2% (2004q2) during
the bubble period. We assume that p = 0:30: i.e. 30% of households own
neither a home nor equity.
Finally, we turn to asset ownership dynamics. We assume that 1 ￿ ￿ =
0:5 of the households did not change their physical claims Ki during the
duration of the bubble period. The remaining households (mass ￿) trade
their claims during the N-year bubble period, replacing their initial ratio
Ki=Wi with a new iid draw from the ergodic distribution of Ki=Wi: This
assumption produces a simulated correlation between Ki=Wi and K0
i=Wi; of
0.50 (a numerical coincidence). Note that K0
i=Wi is unit claims to domestic
capital of household i at the end of the N-year bubble divided by initial net
worth of household i. The actual empirical correlation (using the HRS) is
much lower: 0.26. If we raised ￿ to match this empirical correlation, our
imputed welfare costs would be even higher (since more trading increases
the magnitude of the asset trading e⁄ect). However, we believe that the low
empirical correlation is partly due to measurement error in the HRS. For this
reason we would be biasing our imputed welfare costs up if we picked a ￿
value that was high enough to match the empirical correlation of 0.26.
6 Results
Table 1 reports our benchmark calibration values for the key parameters
that we will vary. Table 1 also reports a low/high range for each variable.
Table 2 reports three additional variables that we will hold ￿xed in all of our
simulations.
Table 1: Critical Parameters low benchmark high
￿ CRRA 1 3 5
￿ bubble magnitude 0.2 0.3 0.4
N bubble duration 8 10 12
￿" standard deviation ln(Ki=Wi); Ki > 0 0.5 0.7 0.9
￿ Fraction of households trading 0.3 0.5 0.7
17Table 2: Fixed Parameters
￿ = r discount rate and real interest rate 0.05
K=C = K=(￿W) aggregate ratios 5
p fraction of households with no K 0.3
Table 3 reports welfare costs using the benchmark values and varying
each variable independently. Several properties stand out. First, our social
welfare costs are typically one to two orders of magnitude larger than Lucas￿
welfare costs. However, this comparison is misleading, since our welfare costs
are not discounted. Our calculations derive the welfare evaluation from the
instant before the bubble begins. In the next section, we generate a timeless
perspective with a recursive argument.
Second, our welfare costs are highly sensitive to the calibration values
of the key parameters. The size of the bubble turns out to be particularly
important. For example, a bubble equal to 40% of the value of the capital
stock is cataclysmic.
Third, the Taylor approximation is usually signi￿cantly larger than the
exact calculation. So the Taylor expansion should only be used as a peda-
gogical tool and not as a close numerical approximation.
Fourth, the asset trading, boom/bust, and aggregation e⁄ects are usually
of similar magnitude.
Fifth, the covariance e⁄ect is about half as large (and of opposite sign)
as the other e⁄ects.
7 The timeless perspective
To make our calculations directly comparable to those of Lucas (1987, 2003),
we now analyze a timeless perspective. Let V be the value function of an
economy with a constant ￿ probability of entering a bubble event and a
welfare loss of 1 ￿ ￿ fraction of permanent consumption in the event of a
bubble. Then,
￿V = u(C) + ￿
￿
￿
1￿￿V ￿ V
￿
V =
u(C)
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
1￿￿ ￿ 1
￿
18Table 3: Calibrated social welfare loss
permanent consumption
Welfare cost as percent of
Decomposition of Taylor Approximation
Table 3: Calibrated social welfare loss
Exact Taylor Trade Boom/bust Covariance Aggregation
Benchmark case
†
2.9% 3.7% 1.6% 1.3% ‐0.6% 1.4%
Low CRRA (γ=1) 0.8% 1.1% 0.5% 0.4% ‐0.2% 0.4%
High CRRA (γ=5) 7.2% 7.3% 2.6% 2.1% ‐1.0% 3.6%
Small bubble (ζ=0.2) 1.1% 1.5% 0.7% 0.6% ‐0.3% 0.5%
Large bubble (ζ=0.4) 33.6% 31.6% 2.8% 2.3% ‐1.1% 27.6%
Short bubble (N=8) 2.3% 3.2% 1.4% 1.0% ‐0.5% 1.3%
Long bubble (N=12) 3.8% 4.2% 1.7% 1.6% ‐0.8% 1.6%
Low K heterogeneity (σ=0.5) 2.0% 2.6% 1.1% 1.0% ‐0.5% 0.9%
High K heterogeneity (σ=0 9) 38 % 48 % 19 % 18 % 08 % 19 % High K heterogeneity (σ=0.9) 3.8% 4.8% 1.9% 1.8% ‐0.8% 1.9%
Low trading (φ=0.3) 2.2% 2.7% 0.9% 1.3% ‐0.4% 0.9%
High trading (φ=0.7) 3.6% 4.6% 2.2% 1.3% ‐0.9% 2.0%
†For the benchmark case, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is γ=3, the bubble is ζ=0.3 proportion of the value stock of physical 
capital,  the duration of the bubble period is N=10 years, the cross‐sectional household‐level standard deviation of the ratio of K/C (for 
K>0) is sigma=0.7, the fraction of households that trade in the N year bubble period is φ=0.5, the interest rate and discount rate are 
both equal to 0.05, the aggregate K/C ratio is 5, and the fraction of households with no claims to the capital stock is 0.3.Let ￿1 represent the timeless social welfare cost of having a stationary ￿
likelihood of entering a bubble event. Then,
u(C)
￿
￿
1￿￿
1 =
u(C)
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
1￿￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿1 =
 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
1￿￿ ￿ 1
￿
! 1
1￿￿
:
If ￿ = 0:05; ￿ = 0:02; and ￿ = 0:97; then ￿1 = 0:987: Hence, the timeless
welfare cost of bubbles is 1.1% of permanet consumption. Moreover, this
calculation overlooks the fact that welfare costs are convex in the magnitude
of the bubble. Even a tiny chance of a bubble that is signi￿cantly larger than
￿ = 0:3 will have potentially large e⁄ects on the timeless welfare cost. Recall
that a bubble of magnitude ￿ = 0:4 implies a welfare cost of 33% of permanent
consumption. If bubbles of this magnitude are added to the distribution of
bubbles, and bubbles of this magnitude occur with a probability of only
1/1000, then the total timeless welfare cost doubles to 2.3% of permanent
consumption.
8 Conclusion
Lucas (1987, 2003) estimates the welfare costs of economic ￿ uctuations and
bounds them above at only 1/10 of 1% of permanent consumption. Motivated
by his analysis, we estimate the welfare costs of an asset bubble. Our model
identi￿es two types of welfare costs: consumption ￿ uctuations due to active
asset trading and consumption ￿ uctuations due to passive asset ownership.
To calibrate the model we use the Health and Retirement Survey and the
Survey of Consumer Finances. With a coe¢ cient of relative risk averion of 3
(our benchmark assumption) the asset bubbles of the last decade have a wel-
fare cost equal to 3% of permanent consumption. With calibrated values for
key parameters, the welfare costs generally lie between 1% and 10% percent
of permanent consumption. Even from the timeless perspective, the welfare
costs in our model are greater than 1% of permanent consumption.
Our model predicts that asset bubbles should give rise to increased con-
sumption inequality in their wake.8 This prediction needs to be tested.
8Atkinson (2009) shows that inequality in Singapore and Malaysia increased as a con-
sequence of the asian ￿nancial crisis in 1997 and 1998.
19Our model also has several policy implications. Our results imply that
the welfare costs of bubbles are highly convex. This suggests that policy
makers consider leaning against the wind only in the presence of large asset
price movements that may be bubbles. A small policy intervention is likely to
have small (second-order) welfare costs if no bubble is present, and enormous
(￿rst-order) welfare gains in the presence of a large bubble. Our results imply
that it is not important to eliminate asset bubbles, just to reduce or constrain
their size.
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23Appendix A
We now use a second-order Taylor expansion to calculate the welfare loss
from the asset bubble. We want to ￿nd ￿ such that
[1 ￿ exp(￿￿N)]u(C + r￿K)
+ exp(￿￿N)u(C ￿ r[exp(rN) ￿ 1](￿K) ￿ rexp(rN)￿k)
= u(￿ + C)
where
C = Y
L + r(K ￿ D):
We expand the argument of the utility function around C: Hence,
u(C + r￿K) = u(C) + u
0(C)(r￿K) +
1
2
u
00(C)(r￿K)
2;
and
u(C ￿ r[exp(rN) ￿ 1](￿K) ￿ rexp(rN)￿k) =
u(C) + u
0(C)(￿r[exp(rN) ￿ 1](￿K) ￿ rexp(rN)￿k)
+
1
2
u
00(C)(r[exp(rN) ￿ 1](￿K) + rexp(rN)￿k)
2:
These expansions imply that
u(C) + [1 ￿ exp(￿￿N)]
￿
u
0(C)(r￿K) +
1
2
u
00(C)(r￿K)
2
￿
+ exp(￿￿N)u
0(C)(￿r[exp(rN) ￿ 1](￿K) ￿ rexp(rN)￿k)
+ exp(￿￿N)
1
2
u
00(C)(r[exp(rN) ￿ 1](￿K) + rexp(rN)￿k)
2
= u(C) + u
0(C)￿ +
1
2
u
00(C)￿
2
We ignore terms in ￿2: Adding this equation up across all agents, the ￿rst
order terms vanish. The households that lose are exactly o⁄set by the house-
holds that gain (in ￿rst order terms).
u
0(C)￿ =
1
2
u
00(C)(r￿K)
2
"
1 ￿ exp(￿￿N) + exp(￿N)
￿
1 ￿ exp(￿rN) +
k
K
￿2#
=
1
2
u
00(C)(r￿K)
2
"
exp(rN) ￿ 1 + 2(exp(rN) ￿ 1)
k
K
+ exp(rN)
￿
k
K
￿2#
24￿
C
=
1
2
C ￿ u00(C)
u0(C)
￿
r￿K
C
￿2 "
exp(rN) ￿ 1 + 2(exp(rN) ￿ 1)
k
K
+ exp(rN)
￿
k
K
￿2#
= ￿
￿
2
￿
r￿K
C
￿2 "
exp(rN) ￿ 1 + 2(exp(rN) ￿ 1)
k
K
+ exp(rN)
￿
k
K
￿2#
= ￿
￿
2
￿
r￿K
C
￿2 "
￿
e
rN ￿ 1
￿￿
1 +
2k
K
￿
+ e
rN
￿
k
K
￿2#
Recall our notation:
￿
￿
C
= ￿:
Hence,
￿ =
￿
2
￿
r￿
C
￿2 ￿
K
2 ￿
e
rN ￿ 1
￿
+ 2kK
￿
e
rN ￿ 1
￿
+ k
2e
rN￿
:
So the average welfare loss,
R
￿idi:
￿
2
￿
r￿
C
￿2 ￿
E
￿
K
2
i
￿￿
e
rN ￿ 1
￿
+ 2Cov(k;K)
￿
e
rN ￿ 1
￿
+ V ar(k)e
rN￿
=
￿
2
￿
2
"
(1 ￿ p)
￿1
￿
K
W
￿2
exp
￿
￿
2
"
￿￿
e
rN ￿ 1
￿
+ 2Cov
￿
ki
Wi
;
Ki
Wi
￿￿
e
rN ￿ 1
￿
+ V ar
￿
ki
Wi
￿
e
rN
#
The ￿rst term in brackets follows from
E
￿
K
2
i
￿
= (1 ￿ p)E
￿
K
2
i jKi > 0
￿
= (1 ￿ p)E
￿
C
2
i exp
￿
2￿ + 2"i ￿ ￿
2
"
￿
jKi > 0
￿
= (1 ￿ p)C
2 exp
￿
2￿ + ￿
2
"
￿
= (1 ￿ p)C
2 exp
￿
￿
2
"
￿
￿
K
C (1 ￿ p)
￿2
= (1 ￿ p)
￿1 exp
￿
￿
2
"
￿
K
2:
25Appendix B
We estimate the ratio of ownership of bubbly assets to total net worth,
K
W
=
E + H
A ￿ L + H + Z + Kh:
Here, E represents equity and A = E + (A ￿ E) are total ￿nancial assets.
L represents ￿nancial liabilities, including mortgages. Physical assets are
denoted by H (housing) and Z (all other assets, e.g. vehicles). Kh, human
capital, is the net present value of future income (excluding capital income).
To calculate this ratio we use data from the Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS) and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
Our unit of analysis for both the HRS and SCF is a single household,
which means that ownership and income values are summed over the primary
respondent and, where applicable, the respondent￿ s spouse.9 To calculate the
above ratio, we use the following procedure. First, all variables except human
capital are constructed from raw survey variables as detailed below. They
are then converted into real terms using CPI data from the Department of
Labor.10
Since the HRS-data are in panel format, we calculate human capital at
time t as
K
h
t =
1 X
s=t
Y L
s
Rt￿s;
where R is the discount rate, which we calibrate as 1.05. Within the survey
timespan, we set Y L
s equal to its realized value when possible. When data
are missing for year s, but are available for s + 1 and s ￿ 1 we impute
Ys = Ys￿1 +
Ys+1 ￿ Ys￿1
2
If a respondent is alive in the last survey wave, we project Y L
s by setting
it to the average of Y values recorded over the course of the survey, and
9In the SCF, the household, de￿ned in this way, is already used as the unit of analysis.
As for the HRS, we select the longest surviving individual member as a representative for
the household.
10Monthly CPI data can be found at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/
cpi/cpiai.txt. HRS data was obtained from https://ssl.isr.umich.edu/hrs/files.
php and SCF data from http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/scfindex.
html.
26increase the discount factor R to R+d = 1:07 to account for the probability
of mortality. Therefore, if a respondent enters the survey at time t and exists
at t + ￿, we get
K
h
t =
t+￿ X
s=t
Y L
s
Rt￿s +
1 X
s=t+￿+1
Y L
average
(R + d)t￿s:
Because the SCF is only cross-sectional, we cannot directly compute Kh
through income. Instead, we ￿rst use the HRS to regress the (log) value of
human capital on age, age squared, years of education11, years of education
squared, and the log value of current income.12 We then take the regression
coe¢ cients and use them to predict values of Kh in the SCF by applying
them to age, years of education, and current income.
11In the SCF, only education of the household head is provided. In the HRS, because
no head is designated, we compute years of education for the household as the average
over individual members.
12This speci￿cation calculates a single regression, aggregating all waves of the HRS
survey. The shape of the distribution of the bubble asset ratio is robust to predicting
SCF values of Kh by regressing on the closest corresponding wave of the HRS. Also, the
distributions are robust to dropping age from the regression entirely.
27Table 1: Composition of ratio components in the HRS
Variable(s) Survey Variable Survey Variable Description
E = HwASTCK Net value of stocks and mutual funds
+ HwABSNS Net value of businesses
+ HwAIRA Net value of IRA and Keogh accounts
(only 100 ￿ age percent are counted as E)
H = HwAHOUS Value of the primary residence
+ HwAHOUB Value of the secondary residence (not reported in 1996)
+ HwARLES Net value of real estate, besides primary and secondary residence
A ￿ E = HwACHCK Net value of checking, savings, and money market accounts
+ HwACD Value of CDs, government savings bonds, and treasury bills
+ HwABOND Net value of bonds or bond funds
+ HwAOTHR Net value of all other savings
+ HwAIRA (only age percent are counted as A ￿ E)
Z = HwATRAN Net value of vehicles
L = HwAMORT Values of ￿rst and second mortgages on primary residence
+ HwAHMLN Values of home loans other than ￿rst and second
mortgages on primary residence
+ HwAMRTB Value of a second home mortgage on secondary residence
+ HwADEBT Value of other debt
Y = HwITOT Sum of all income in household
￿ HwICAP Business or farm income, self-employment earnings, business
income, gross rent, dividend and interest income, trust funds or
royalties, and other asset income
28Table 2: Composition of ratio components in the SCF
Variable(s) Survey Variable Survey Variable Description
E = NMMF Total value of directly held pooled investment funds
+ STOCKS Total value of directly held stocks
+ RETQLIQ Value of IRAs, Keoghs, thrift-type accounts, and account-
type pensions (only 100 ￿ age percent counted as E)
H = HOUSES Total value of primary residence
+ ORESRE Total value of other residential real estate
+ NNRESRE Total value of net equity in nonresidential real estate
A + H + Z ￿ L = NETWORTH Total net worth of household
Y = INCOME Total income of household
￿ KGINC Capital gain or loss income
￿ INTDIVINC Interest (taxable and nontaxable) and dividend income
.
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